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ABSTRACT
The paper examines the determinants of ownership structure characteristics of the 147 main
board firms listed on the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange (KLSE). We apply nature of the firm
theory :- asymmetric information, agency conflicts and risk as discussed in Putterman (1993).
Ownership concentration is divided into dispersed, dominant minority, and majority controlled
firms. In addition we introduce ownership identities- family controlled, conglomerate, others
institution, state, foreign and dispersed firms in explaining above variables. We partially prove
that ownership structures are able to extract cost and benefits of governance issues. We further
provide evidence of the influences of ownership identities on asymmetric information, and risk.
In terms of performance, family controlled firms appear to be pursuing maximization of sales
and shareholder's value objectives well. Conglomerate firms are found to exploit firm's value
but declare high dividend. However, dispersed structure does not seem to conform to
maximization of sales, and maximization of shareholders hypotheses.
THE DETERMINANTS OF'OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE IN MALAYSIA
tNrnooucTroN
The separation of owner (financial provider) from decision maker (manager) creates agency
problem between these two entities in the firm. Agency problem arises when shareholders yeam
for capital return while the later may misappropriate shareholders' investment. The exploitation
can stem from large concentrated structure where large shareholders exploit minority
shareholders or from dispersed structure where the management takes advantage of external
shareholders (Fama and Jensen, 1983 ; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). The implications of
misalignment structure are far-reaching wide as it influences financial market activeness and
firms' perfornance. First, ownership structures have an effect on the development and
performance of capital and debt market, as high concentration structure distracts capital
allocation efficacy in an economy. Conversely, a dispersed ownership structure in an economy
can promote capital market activeness due to the ease of entry and exit of investors (Maher and
Anderson, 1999) ; Ownership and control also influence debt market as managers can adjust the
proportion of debt and equity to their best interest (Agrawal and Nagarajan, 1990). These affect
firm's cost of capital eventually. Second, ownership structure plays an important role in the
governance and performance of firms. It functions as monitoring and governance mechanism for
the board and further enhance firm's performance. The proposition of this view comes from,
among others Fama and Jensen (1983) and Short et al (2002\
Three dimensions of ownership structure in literature have attracted numerous studies. Firstly,
dispersion of ownership and conflict are addressed by Berle and Means (1932) , Cubbin and
Leech (1983) and Leech and Leahy (1991). The second dimension is largely based on the above
dispersed structure conflicts and draws on the work of Jensen and Meckling's (1976), who call
for managerial incentives to reduce misalignments between controlling managers and dispersed
shareholders. Pertaining to this, Morck et al (1988) and Gedajkovic and Shapiro (1998)
substantiate Jensen and Meckling's argument by comparing managerial controlled firms and
owner controlled firm's perfonnance. Thirdly, Shleifer and Vishny (1986) , Zeckauser and
Pound (1990), Agrawal and Knoeber (1996), Gugler (2001a) and others address the issue of
large shareholders. This ownership structure issue is profoundly found in non Anglo-Saxon
economies as compared to Anglo Saxon's dispersion model. Demsetz (1983) argues
theoretically that ownership struchre is an endogenous outcome balancing the costs ( e.g. risk)
and benefits (e.g. monitoring) of ownership. The differences of ownership structure between
different types block of economies simply reflect different costs and benefits of institutional
economic structure explanation in each economic system. However, the above mentioned tlree
dimensions have not considered the more complex issues of firm's ownership theory such as
owners' identities and objectives, cross holdings and other institutional transaction costs
economies issues as raised by Williamson (1985) .
Although the issue of equity identity is important, it is often neglected in the literature/economic
research. This dimension of ownership structure has its strategic implications for their objectives
and the way management exercises power upon firm's economic activities and performance.
Some papers in this area are Hansman (1988) , Gugler (2001b), Thomsen and Pedersen (1998;
2000), Gursoy and Aydogan (2002). Apart of share concentration, generally the papers
incorporate owners' objectives and institutional economics arguments to discuss the emergence
of corporate ownership structure in different economies. Gugler for instance, review literately the
role of banks and state ownership and firm characteristics in European market. Thomsen and
Pedersen, on the other hand discuss the formation of ownership structure based on identities
against institutional economics arguments for European large economies
Malaysia attempts to liberalise its capital market for firther economic development and growth.
Generally, Malaysian firms as reported by La Porta, Lopoz and Shleifer (1999) are highly
concentrated'. By and large, the owners are also usually the directors of the company. The
founder family and descendents are also strongly in control of the firm (Claessens, Djankov and
Lang, 1998) . With this large shareholder structure, it often allows cross holdings and pyramid
structure to exist and control other firms without high financial outlays. This method also allows
large shareholders to exploit minority shareholders. In this regard, Claessens, Fan and Lang
(1999) found no substantial proof of large shrreholders using cross holdings and pyramid
structure to exploit minority interest in Malaysia". On the other hand, Lemmon and Lins (2003)
substantiate that exploitation through this structure only occur during shock period. During
economic prosperity, the expected amount of expropriation will be relatively small and will be
already capitalised into current price. Firms in a small emerging and relatively young market,
also indicate strong entrepreneurial characteristics. Enhancing firm's value and market share are
their main objectives, where- founding family members and descendent retain intact control of the
firm. In Malaysia, state"' participation in equity ownership represent an important socio-
political agenda due to government policy to rationalise the distribution of economic resources
among different races. Theoretically, state controlled firms may pursue distribution of residual
return to their shareholders. The establishment and listing of foreign subsidiary reflects different
corporate agenda as compared to other local firms. In Malaysia, Hui (1981), studies the largest
firms ownership and control formation during the 1970s, Ling (1982) discusses ownership
structure from the social economic income distribution perspective for the relatively same
period. Noor, Said and Redzuan (1999) and Ali (2001) focused on the issues of insider share
ownership and performance. Noor et. al. conclude that firms' perfonnance follows a non linear
relationship with insider(director) ownership. However, there is a lack of literature that discusses
the determinants of ownership structure based on ownership and nature of the firm's theory on
the Malaysian economy. The understanding of ownership structure theory is essential as it affects
capital market policy planning, and enhances our knowledge of the ways in which firms allocate
the sources of external funding.
Roe (1994; 2001) construes that ownership structure follows a path dependency that allows a
given ownership structure to reinforce itself by developing a network of complementary
institutions. Thomsen and Pedersen (1996) concede that different histories, cultures and paths of
economic development better explain the differing structures than economic theories alone. In
light of this discourse and the brief explanation of Malaysian ownership structure above,
Malaysia market offers a different perspective of corporate governance schemes to be compared.
In this paper, we follow the theory of the natwe of the firm as discussed in Putterman (1993) by
looking at the cost and benefits of firms in dealing with various firm's governance issues:-
specific asymmetric information, agency conflicts as well as risks in different types of ownership
structure along its ownership concentration. McConaughy, Walker, Henderson et al.(1998)
concede that inconclusive result in ownership studies is due to limitation of ownership
concentration which does not address the issues of shareholders' identities. Thus, apart of
measuring firm's specific characteristic according to governance issues, we also partition the
owners' identities- family, conglomerate affiliation, state, and foreign controlled structure. We
are interested in looking at how different ownership structure and their identities are formed
given different degree of asymmetric information, agency conflicts and risk perceived.
The paper is structured as follows. Section II explains the ownership structure framework used in
this study. Section III reviews the theoretical framework. Section IV discusses the hypotheses
and methodology. Section V reports the empirical findings, and Section VI concludes.
OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE FRAMEWORI(
The inconclusive studies of ownership structure make it necessary to study the identity of owners
and shareholder concentration in a firm. Thomsen and Pedersen (1996) divide ownership
concentration into dispersed structure (< 20 percentage), dominant minority structure (20 
- 
50
percentage) and majority (> 50 percentage). They cite that the study of ownership concentration
is meaningful only when we can compare the efficacy of these structures in extracting cost and
benefits from a firm's economic function. In addition to that, they also conclude that different
countries posit different controlling identities such as government and cooperatives which need
to be addressed separately due to their different objectives in firms (Pedersen and Thomsen,
1997;2000).
Dispersed structure as highlighted by Berle and Means (1,932) has a role in separation and
specialisation of risk bearing and management (Fama and Jensen, 1983). Theoretically, this
structure stands largely in firms where risk is too much to be concentrated in a single large
shareholder. Dominant minority control firms, illustrate an intermediate share concentration
where costs and benefits of governance issues are significant, but not overwhelming. Lastly,
majority controlled illustrates firms that are less risk averse where a single owner is able to bear
higher risk and less degree of separation between owner and decision maker.
Gursoy and Aydogan (2002) separate ownership into family and conglomerate affiliation
ownership along with other structure -- state and foreign ownership. They posit that frms in
which an individual directly controls or through private limited firms where the owners still
operate and control as family controlled firms. In terms of degree of share concentration, this
structure is mostly found in dominant minority structure and retains their initial thrust of
entrepreneurship despite having raised funds from external market. Therefore, firms in this
strucfure appear to be more risk averse.
A more complex structure is conglomerate affiliation where a public listed firm is controlled by
another public listed firm Gursoy and Aydogan (2002). Although some may still be controlled by
the initial founder, their objectives have already diverted from family controlled structure whose
owners are entrepreneurial in nature. Conglomerate affiliation firms are held to achieve empire
building and economic growth through inter-corporation's equity holdings. By doing so, this
gives them opportunities to create "tunnelling benefits " which benefit them as a relatively small
enables them to control a pyramid group of public listed companies (Morck and Yeung, 2003).
Often, this structure adversely affects the firm's value (Claessens et al,1999)
Theoretically, state investment aims to serve the purpose of social welfare economics. They tend
to invest in larger size and risky firms due to the availability of larger pool of state funds and
undertake the risk which the private sector finds too risky . State ownership has been criticised
as weak governance mechanism as public portfolio exacerbates tendencies to free ride in the
monitoring of funds management (Putterman, 1993). Wurgler (2000) compares financial market
development over 65 countries and concludes that state owned firms are jeopardised by soft
budget, poor monitoring, political motives. He also finds a negative relationship between the
efficiency of capital allocation with the extent of state ownership. In addition, shareholders
expect government-controlled firms to be governed by their own set of laws. Literature mostly
suggests that state owned firms are likely to perform sub optimally. Theoretically, however, state
controlled firms are expected to conect market failure by acting differently from private firms
(Shepherd, 1989) . State owned firms are also perceived to be big and wealthy due to their easier
access to economic opportunities and also resources such as credit and capital.
Dunning (1981) states that foreigner ownership emphasises the advantages of localization to
serve its market from local rather than export from their home countries. Local establishments
allow them to internalise the physically separated units into one single corporation.
Economically, foreign subsidiaries reduce transaction costs, and enhance competencies and
performances. Foreign controlled firms are usually found in particular specific industries such as
industries in which natural endowment is scarce (oil), or where the intemational brand name has
been well established (tobacco and retail trading). Other factors that require wider foreign
participation may be due to highly specific assets and technology requirements which locals are
unable to establish and operate. From the ownership and control perspective, foreign ownership
rationales are aligned with transaction economics arguments (Williamson 1985 ), which
emphasize the importance of economies of scale and scope (Chandler, 1990). Foreign branch is
consistent with the hypothesis that multinational companies often internalise vertically integrated
activities. Since the main objectives are to serve the home shareholders, this structure basically
aims to maximize shareholder value.
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
The locus of ownership structure lies between the specialisation of risk bearing, provision of
finance and decision-making functions of a firm (Fama and Jensen, 1983). Although these
functions as embodied in the Modem Corporation as proposed by Berle and Means (1932), are
separable, they are usually found together in the firms of market economies (Putterman, 1993).
In this circumstance, moral hazard, arises when the cost of risk bearing is inversely proportional
to the degree of control the risk bearer exercises over the risks taken. To ameliorate this
problem, Jensen and Meckling (1976) advocate the use of debt and equity to alleviate the
potential of moral hazard as a result of the separation between owner and control, and to some
degree ofcontrol which the risk bearer exercises over the risks taken. This proposal has drawn
different strands of views and findings in view of different debate in managerial ownership and
also large block shareholders.
Aeencv Conflicts: Leverage
There are two outcomes in debt or equity utilisation. This depends on the degree of control the
risk taker has and the juggling of power with the existing manager. For instance, large
shareholders may misuse the debt to invest sub optimally in rislcy projects. Jensen and Meckling
(1976), and Harris (1991) view this tendency of debt holding as 'shifting to risky projects' or
asset substitution. Therefore, shareholders may welcome the use of debt to invest sub optimally,
as the risk faced by equity holders is lesser. More specifically, if an investment yields large
returns well above the debt's face value, it is the debtors' resources that are at risk if the
investment fails, as the firm defaults on the terms promised. Shareholders have more to gain in
view of their limited liability. The loss in value of the equity from the poor investment can be
more than offset by the gain in equity captured at the expense of debt holders. This argument is
consistent with Berglofs (1990) incomplete contracting framework, that debt levels should be
higher in firms with a concentrated ownership structure compared to when ownership is widely
held. Similarly Friend and Lang (1988) conclude that a positive relationship exists between debt
holdings and large share ownership.
Jensen (1986) postulates the argument that large shareholders may prefer to utilise debt as a
disciplinary mechanism. This is due to the fact that debt bonding provides less discretion for
management to engage in non-profit maximising behaviour by reducing the amount of free cash
flow under their control. Firth (1995) and Berger (1997) substantiate this argument with the
positive relationship between debt and large external shareholders in US market. By engaging in
debt, firms are obliged to pre-commit or bond themselves to achieve the levels of cash flow
necessary to meet the debt repayment. Bonding and debt covenant also reduces management
discretion to consume perquisites to the detriment of other shareholders.
However, the relationship in owner manager controlled firms is the opposite. Owner manager
controlled firms are more risk averse. Their incentives to engage in asset substitution is likely to
be reduced. Correspondingly, debt holdings decrease (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Friend and
Lang (1988) establish empirically the negative relationship between managerial ownership and
debt portion. Short et al (2002) corroborate these findings as owner managerial firms have built
up their own specific indivisible firm specific human and wealth capital, which they preserve for
firms' development and expansion. By virtue of this, owner-managers become risk averse, and
reduce the incentives for debt financing, as a higher proportion ofdebt increases the chances of
bankruptcy. Therefore, a family controlled firm with insider ownership particularly is more
cautious to avoid moral hazard and tend to engage in lower portion of debt.
Conglomerate affiliation firms characterise a different picture towards leverage. Williamson
(1985) argues that the advantages of risk reduction that conglomerate may have in allocating
capital could be subject to diminishing returns. The risk reduction benefits debt holders as the
risk of bankruptcy has decreased. This, however, work against shareholders as rate of return has
declined. Subsequently, the firm may issue more debt and correspondingly retire equrty to
neutralise the above effect, with consequent tax advantages to the shareholders. This benefit
could provide significant incentives for the formation of conglomerate firms in situations where
risk reduction is important. Likewise, Jensen and Meckling (1976) note that in industries where
the freedom of management to take riskier projects is severely constrained, debt financing will
be more intensive.
Less empirical literature reports on the agency cost of debt in state control firms. However, it is
conceivable to argue that state controlled firms are able to access cheaper debt such as sourcing
funds internally through allocation of funding and subsidies from govemment. For instance,
Suto (2003) reports Malaysian government leams from the Japanese major banking system, and
encourages firms to enter relationship with banks. Pertaining to multinational firms, Peyer
(2001) argues that multinational firms tend to rely on intemal funding from their home head
quarter rather than external capital when pursuing international diversification strategies.
Similarly, Booth, .F'ivazian, Demirguc and et. al (2003) concede that multinational firms from
developed nations apply internal funds more than firms from developing countries.
Contrary to leverage, dividend is the residual income, which is to be distributed to residual
claimants if not utilised for firms' future expansion and growth. Jensen (1986) suggests that in
the diffused ownership structure, the manager is reluctant in paying out this 'free iash flow' as
extra dividends to their shareholders. Instead, these firms may engage in unprofitable
expenditures, particularly upon preferred diversifications and R&D. In contrast to dispersed
structure, Anderson and Reeb (2003) note that family and conglomerate affiliation controlled
firms are also capable of expropriating wealth through special dividends. Family desires for
special dividends can afflict ftrm's capital expansion plans, leading to poor operating and stock
price performance. The state ownership in Malaysia aims to distribute dividend income to the
indigenous (Bumiputra) unit holders, as part of the national policy to encourage the indigenous
group to participate in the equity market. Multinational companies emphasise distribution of
dividend to maximise shareholder's value. Foreign firms also depend on their own internal
capital and do not have the conflicts between distribution of cash flow and capital financing.
Asymmetric Information
Fama and Jensen (1983) construe that ownership structure depends on the issue of whether
specific information or knowledge can be shared with other dispersed shareholders. They argue
that smaller firms are more effective with higher concentration as this ownership structure results
in higher degree of association between decision management and decision confrol. Therefore,
this reduces the cost of monitoring. Furthermore, in a smaller firm, the risk sharing benefits
foregone are less serious than in a large organisation, as the total risk of net cash flows to be
shared is generally smaller in a small organisation. Similarly, family ownership should have a
higher concentration structure to reduce the cost of separation of decision management and
control, and hence a more effective management. In larger firms, the information asymmetry
problem is more serious. This increases risks and cost of monitoring correspondingly. Hence, a
dispersed structure is expected to share the cost and risks with others.
Clarke (1987) notes that the emergence of conglomerate affiliation firm helps to reduce
information asymmetry. This structure reduces the problems associated with efforts to obtain
information from the capital market. This conjecture is consistent with Williamson's (1985)
transaction cost economics argument that conglomerate affiliation has special advantages in
allocating capital to high value uses compared to the normal capital allocation process.
Similarly, the setting up of large multinational branches (by foreign companies) reduces the need
to subcontract the activity to host country indigenous firm. This serves to considerably reduce
information asymmetry problem in multinational firms (Casson, 1987) .
Risk
The risk preference profile of different ownership structure depends on the degree of risk the
owner (as a risk bearer) is willing to bear. The theory of ownership structure cites that dispersed
owner with diversified portfolios is least averse to firm's specific risk (Fama 1980). As
shareholders have diversified their investment they are more willing to bear a higher firm
specific risk.
Two strands of view appear in the relationship between risk and large shareholder. First, owners
investing a significant share of their wealth in a single company are more likely to advocate low
risk company strategies. Therefore, majority controlled firms tend to be risk averse due to their
large personal investment. Commensurate with this view, family controlled firms tend to be
more defensive in their strategies too. Second, in contrast to the above, Gursoy and Aydogan
(2002) cite that, to the extent a firm can diversiff, owners tend to take relatively higher risks than
managers. This is especially true in a larger shareholder concentration firm, where owners have
the incentive to take higher risks at the expense of creditor, by applying higher debt to fund risky
project. Similarly, Demsetz and Lehn (1985) suggest that in a volatile environment, a firm will
enjoy better payoff in maintaining tighter control. Hence, a risky environment should give rise to
more concentrated ownership structure.
Pertaining to conglomerate firm, Clarke (1987) concludes that conglomerate firms would forgo
risky investrnents, as conglomerate firms will be less able to diversiff their risks compared to the
market. This is due to the fact that the owner constitutes a large voting right in firm's residual
claims, and hence attempts to avoid any risk which it is unable to bear.
Life Cycle and Objectives
Firm's objectives are dependent on their ownership structure and firm's life cycle (Putterman,
1993). Dispersed structure as compared to majority control firm often finds their managers
pursuing objective of maximization of sales growth in lieu of maximizing of shareholder's value.
In contrast large shareholder controlled firms pursue the maximization of shareholder value, as
they own a large portion of equity in it. Morck, Stangeland and Yeung (2000) note that the
entrepreneur characteristic is strongly found in majority controlled structure as they have not lost
control to other shareholders despite years of public floatation of the companies' shares. In view
of this, such firms may pursue maximisation of owner's profit - that is to maximise shareholder
value since they stand to gain the most as the largest owners of the firms. On the contrary, a firm
which lacks entrepreneurial characteristics would have failed to defend their controlling interest.
The initial family/founder controlling stake has been diluted.
However, while entrepreneurial characteristics may wear thin, the controlling family may link up
with other firms and enter into a pyramid structure, in the hope of seeking out "tunnelling
benefits". While they pursue this objective, managers may act for the controlling family, but not
for shareholders. They pursue strategies that are detrimental to public investors. This might lead
them to over expand and lead to marginal growth in a country's economy (Morck and Yeung,
2003).
METIIODOLOGY AND ITYPOTIIESES
The sample data are compiled from Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange (KLSE) Annual Companies
Handbook Volume 2l various issues for the year of 1996. We focus on the explanatory variables
of firms listed on main board only for 1996, the year before the regional economic crisis, to
avoid any unnecessary shock impacts. However, performance may come after ayear, to capture
this effect, market performance variables are measured using 1997 data with the presumption
that 1996's explanatory variables are constant. Banking and finance, and insurance sectors are
left out due to its highly regulated characteristics'". Some firms' financial data were not
consistently available as at financial year stipulated. Some industries have too few observations
to have any meaningful analysis. Thus, we are satisfied with only 147 firms drawn from seven
industries- Property (n:31), industry (n:22), plantation (n:21), trading (n=20), consumer
(n:15), food (n:12), building materials (n:26). The total sample represents an averuge of 32%o
of the main board companies between 1995-2001. Firm's specific variables that determine the
formation of ownership structure, and hypotheses for corporate govemance issues attributable to
the influence of the financial provider and decision management are summarised in Table l. We
employ multinominal logistic regressions to examine the association of each variable with the
described structure.
The main advantage of applying multinominal logistic regression in the study of ownership
strucfure is that we can compare the degree of differences of each explanatory variable on each
ownership structure. This gives us a fair view on the variables that influence ownership strucfure
greatly.
We use logarithm of firm size, cash flow as well as age of firms as proxies to measure the
problem of asymmetric information. In larger-sized ftms, the problem of asymmetric
information is more serious; this corresponds to the incremental risk that needs to be shared with
more shareholders. Hence, dispersed structure is expected. Large firm size also indicates less
asset specificity which may be shared between the firm's founder and the widely spread
shareholders to share the risk together. In contrast, smaller firm size and net cash flow are
associated with large concentrated ownership as the risk sharing benefits and total risk of net
cash flow foregone are less serious than in a large organisation. Cash flow is defined as cash
flow from operations- profit/(loss) before tax plus depreciation adjusted for share of results of
associated and exceptional items. The cash flow data was obtained from Corporate Hand Book
published by Singapore Corporate Data Source Pte Ltd. The older firms with large controlling
stake in particular large shareholders signiS a higher degree of asymmetric information, which
would not like to be share with others. In order to reduce the problem of agency cost created by
information asymmetry, the establishment of family ownership helps in alleviating the
monitoring cost, while conglomerate firms reduce asymmetric information through
internalisation of vertical integration activities in large firms. Multinational firms serve the
purpose of reducing asymmetric information in large firms across countries.
We hypothesize that larger concentration structure posits a higher leverage by virnre of higher
benefits obtained relatively to debt holder as debt portion increases. In contrast, dispersed
structure engages in lower debt structure. We conjecture that multinational and state controlled
l0
firms prefer internal capital as discussed in literature. The leverage ratio is measwed as total debt
over total equity.
Majority, foreign and state controlled firms are expected to establish the goals of maximization
of shareholder value by returning residual income to shareholders. Those structures also
emphasize ftrm's market and economic performance. Majority controlled firms may be
concerned with retaining dividends for personal benefits. In contrast, dispersed structure is
presumed to declare less dividend as Jensen (1986) posited. Dividend is measured as gross
dividend per share declared and paid out for the financial year.
Pertaining to performance, Demsetz and Lehn (1985) contend that controlling managers in
dispersed structure would sacrifice owner profit for increased output. Larger output and sales
generally enhance manager's salary compensation. However, diffuseness of ownership render
free rider problem to constrain such managers' objective. Conversely, large shareholders are
more concemed about profits as they hold a large portion of the residual interest. We employ
Tobin's q and price eaming ratio (PE) for the measurement of market performance, return of
asset (ROA) for accounting performance and logarithm of sales for sales growttr. We use
Tobin's q calculation as applied by Chung and Pruitt's (1994) Chen and Steiner (2000) and
Chen and Ho (2000) . The Tobin's q is computed as (Book value of total assets - book value of
equity * market value of equity) divided by book value of total assets.
We employ standard deviation of firm's sales over total asset as business risk and beta as capital
market risk to measure different ownership structure perceptions of risk as in Gursoy nd
Aydogan (2002). We expect that higher concentration structure is receptive to risk averse
investment. As their equity wealth is highly associated with the risk they undertake. Hence,
majority control structure tends to be more defensive. Capital risk is measured by using beta,
obtained from Corporate Hand Book 1999 published by Singapore Corporate Data Source Pte
Ltd. It is calculated as natural log of weekly returns of the stock price against the weekly returns
of the KLSE-EMAS index. Dispersed structure is regarded as the least averse to capital market
risk as dispersed shareholders are presumed to diversiff their investment and willing to
undertake higher capital market risk. Similarly, they tend to support risky business investment
due to their small portion of residual interest in the firms.
We classified firms' structure according to substantial shareholders as reported in Kuala Lumpur
Stock Exchange Handbook. The classification was based on substantial shareholding disclosure
as required by Section 69D(1), Companies Act 1965. The act stipulates the mandatory disclosure
of substantial shareholders who hold more than five percent of equity in any firm irrespective of
their direct or indirect control interest. This includes their investment through nominees'
institutions and others means. Using substantial shareholders to classify ownership structure
gives us an advantage over the use of largest shareholders. In Malaysia, many firms are
controlled by certain parties via nominee names to remain anonymousu. Hence, using largest
shareholders as practiced in other countries will not be very meaningful in Malaysia. We use the
first single largest substantial shareholder to classiff ownership skucture. We find that the first
substantial shareholder exerts de facto control in a large number of our sample firms. This is
shown by share concentration difference between the first largest substantial shareholder (mean:
38.74o4), and the second largest shareholder (mean:19.75Yo) atthe significance level of p<0.01.
ll
The use of 20 percentage as the base line of dispersed structure approximately conforms to La
Porta's (Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, A. Shleifer et al, 1998) argument that Malaysian effective
control stood around l8.ll%.In addition, Cheang (1996) notes that a l5o/o to 25o/o control over
voting rights is sufficient for control. The majority control of 50o/o is in accordance to de jure
control in this economy.
In the second step, follow Gursoy and Aydogan (2002), we separate firms with more than 20
percentage of substantial shareholdings with individual and private limited holdings control as
family control. Firms which are controlled via other public listed firms, are classified as
conglomerate firms. In addition to that, we regard the remaining firms whose identities can't be
identified as institutional. These include firms whose largest substantial shareholders are trustee
and nominees companies.
[Insert Table I about here]
[Insert Table 2 about here]
Table 2 (panel A) presents the descriptive statistic of variables applied in this study, while panel
B summarizes the distribution of firms in different type of ownership structure and ownership
identities.
Basically Malaysian firms share distribution is highly concentrated in between dominant
minority (n: 58, 35.37%) and majority structure (n:32,21.77%) (table 2 panel B). There were
25 state controlled firms with the means concentration of 42.97%o as compared to 22 frms with
the means concentration of I1.75% in dispersed structure. Foreign controlled firms constitute
6.120/o from this sample with the average share concentration of 50.42%.In terms of identities,
there are 57 family controlled and 33 conglomerate affiliation controlled firms respectively.
The model below shows the full model of multinominal logistic analysis with chi-square value in
our study.
Ownership structure: Leverage (=4.518) +Dividend (36.25)**+ FirmSize (5.937)+ Cash
(17.395)***+ Bus.Risk (13.263)x*'r+ Cap. Risk( 9.688)*** Yrs.Est (2.371)+ Yrs List(3.545)
Pseudo-Ri: 55.95%. *p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p< 0.01
Clearly, all variables except leverage, firm size, and years of establishment and listing show
significant differences between structures at p< 0.05 and above. We proceed with the
multinominal logistic analysis to analyze the effect of each individual explanatory variables on
each ownership structure.
[Insert Table 3 about here]
t2
Dispersed structure is used as the baseline (co-efficient:0) for our analysis (Table 3). The table
clearly shows that majority and dominant minority control structure mitigate the problem in
separation of ownership and control. Dividend declarations in both structures are higher than
dispersed structure. This conforms to Jensen's (1986) misappropriation of cash flow by
managerial controlled firm's argument. However, we are uncercain whether high dividend
declaration in majority and dominant minority is truly in the form of "special personal
dividend". State and foreign controlled firms clearly set out to maximize shareholder value as
they distribute the highest dividend. The findings are consistent with our hypotheses. The agency
conflict between debt and equity remains vague, as there are no significant differences between
these five structures. The issues of insider ownership and identity's objectives may have
affected this issue. This necessitates us to study the identity of owner in dispersed, dominant and
majority structure.
Dispersed structure shows the largest value in terms of firm's size. However, it is not
significantly different from other structure, except for state control. It is against the hypothesis as
we expected state controlled firms to be associated with higher frrm's size"'. The result is
believed to be caused by the presence of firms owned by state investment arms as well as state
economic development corporations, which invest in a firm to get short term return.
Nonetheless, cash flow addresses the issue of asymmetric information clearly. Negative
difference in cash flow for majority controlled firms illustrates that the firms have specificity of
asset (smaller cash flow) which do not share with other shareholder. Likewise, less cash flow in
foreign controlled firm shows the same scenario as internalization of operation reduces the
problem of asymmetric information. Both findings conform to our hypotheses. Inversely, state
and dispersed structure have higher cash flow, which need to be shared with others to reduce the
risk. This also implies that both structures have less firm specificity. All these findings conform
to our hypotheses.
Dispersed structure firms appear to be greater risk taker compared to dominant minority control
firms. However, as share concentration increases, the risk receptive behavior increases. This is
contradictory to our hypothesis that majority controlled firms are risk averse. The risk reception
behavior in majority-controlled firms suggests firms may apply other less costly means to
achieve their personal objectives. However, this requires further study in terms of firms'
identities. By nature of their investment and objectives, state controlled firms in Malaysia appear
to be risk averse
Dispersed structure also shows a highest perception towards capital market risk as compared to
other structures. Although the difference is not significant as compared to dominant and majority
control structure, the significant differences can be observed in state controlled and foreign
controlled structures, which illustrates the most risk averse toward capital market risk. These
findings are in line with our hypotheses that dispersed structure is more risk favorable due to
their dispersed shareholdings.
Finally, despite dispersed structure showing an older age of listing relative to majority structure,
the difference is not significant. The older age of listing indicates the controlling stake of
entrepreneur has been diluted. Interestingly, state controlled firms appear to control younger
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firms. This exemplifies that younger firms are easier to be taken over if the owner loses the thrust
to pursue business entrepreneurship. There are no differences in firm's age of listing between
dispersed structure and foreign controlled as in ow hypotheses. We observe no significant
differences between age of establishment between ownership structure as well. This could be due
to Malaysian firms are relatively young as compared to developed economies.
Ownership Identities
As some issues are vague, we further separate ownership concentration into owner identities.
Table 4 summarizes the differences of the variables according to ownership identities.
[Insert Table 4 about here]
Apparently, leverage ratio is indifferent between different ownership identities (table 4). Family
ownership firms pursue higher debt policy, which indicates the possibility of transfening risk
that benefits them more. This financing policy does not seem to differ from others, except
significantly higher than foreign controlled firms. Interestingly, dispersed structure utilizes as
much debt as conglomerate. Firms controlled by institutional investors also experience higher
leverage than expected, this reflects the serious problem of monitoring by institutional investors.
Nevertheless, indifferent level of leverage during the period is consistent with Polerleano's
(1998) argument that Malaysian micro policy has encouraged more credit allocation in the
market as corporate debt securities market was actively introduced to the market since the end of
1980s. Similarly, Suto (2003) concedes that corporate bonds issuance was preferred compared to
public offering during the period before the crisis of 1997 . This inevitably transfers the risk from
equity holders to debt holders, which significantly increases the chances of bankruptcy.
Table 4 also reflects that conglomerate firms show the possibility of expropriating wealth
through special dividends that conforms to Anderson and Reed's (2003) argument. Foreign and
state controlled firms declare more dividend than family controlled firms. Overall, the findings
comply with our hypothesis.
Again, firm size, a variable for the problem of asymmetric information does not significantly
reflect firm's characteristic. Although it is not significantly different from others, conglomerate's
highest size indicate the internalization of the organization structure to reduce the problem of
asymmetric information. State ownership firm size is lower than dispersed, conglomerate and
foreign structure. This finding is consistent with our finding in Table 3. The insignificant
difference between ownership identities can possibly be thus explained: firms in the relatively
small Malaysian economy are in the growing stage, where firms are fast expanding.
Nevertheless, the use of proxy for firm size is always a debatable issue (Chan, 1985).
Consistent with the finding in table 3, state controlled firms show higher value of cash flow
which can be shared with more shareholders. With the exception of conglomerate firms,
dispersed structure cash flow is relatively higher than others. The findings are consistent with
our hypotheses. On the other hand, align with Willismson's (1985) argument, we find high cash
flow in conglomerate firms. This suggests that the structure could well be created to reduce
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asymmetric information problem. In addition, this structure has=special advantages in allocating
capital to high value uses compared to the normal capital allocation process.
In contrast to Clarke's (1987) argument, family and conglomerate firms are found to be business
risk inclined. This may due to two reasons. First, this conforms to Demsetz and Lehn (1985)
suggestion that family and conglomerate firms enjoy better payoff in maintaining tighter control
in a risky environment. Secondly, it may be involved in risk-transfer activities 
- 
transferring
risks to the debt holder as suggested in Jensen and Meckling (1976). Foreign firms and
institutional controlled firms illustrate the highest business risk behavior. In contrast to the
hypotheses, state controlled and dispersed structure are business risk averse. In terms of capital
market risk, as expected, dispersed structure respond positively to market volatility.
Conglomerate firms and state controlled firms and institutional strucfures are less responsive to
the capital market risk, consistent with our hypotheses.
Clearly, our study discovers some inconsistencies in the structure of ownership in Malaysia. We
also observed the influence of the objectives of ownership identities in dividend disfribution as
well as information asymmetry. Firm size does not appear to be different with each other since
Malaysia is an emerging economy where firms are mostly in the growing stage. However, all
clearly reflect that ownership structure does not extract cost and benefits effectively from the
govemance issues in this study.
Ownership Structure and Performance
Thomsen and Pedersen (1996) conclude that ownership categories are functional factors with
regards to asymmetric information, transaction cost economies and others variable. Market
forces in certain industries will tend to produce an efficient match between company and
ownership. The path theory (Bebchuk and Roe, 1999) argues that if a particular ownership mode
were associated with inferior financial performance, firms belonging to it would decline, exit the
industry or change their ownership category. The assumption is thus, the prevailing structure
may be interpreted as efficient or there are no systematic differences in performance. However as
shown in the previous discussion, frrms in Malaysia do not efficiently extract and distribute
resources according to the economic theory of ownership structure. Apparently, ownership
identities are able to influence the governance issues- asymmetric information, agency conflicts
and risk. The following section looks at ownership structure and performance with the influence
of asymmetric information, agency conflicts and risk perceived. We expect different structure to
show different degrees of performance.
We applied log sales as maximization of sales objectives, ROA as accounting performance, PE
ratio and Tobin's q value as measurement for market performance. We treat governance issues-
agency conflicts, asymmetric information and risk as controlled variables. As dividend and cash
are associated with the problem of unequal variances, we exclude these two variables from our
analysis. Years effect are also dropped due to insignificant result in the analysis above. We
exclude foreign controlled firms in the model to avoid auto-correlation problem.
According to the results presented in table 5, we can assert that ownership classification based on
concentration is related to accounting and market based measures of performance. Dispersed
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structure shows a negative relationship with sales value, which does not conform to Demsetz and
Lehn's (1985) and our hypotheses. In additional, it does not pursue maximization of
shareholder's value as shown by the negative significant relationship with ROA and Tobin's q
value in 1996 and 1997 respectively.
Majority controlled firms are more profound in profrt efficiency as compared to others which
signiff the role of large shareholder in governing companies, whilst negative performance in
dispersed structure illustrates the problem of free rider problem in this structure. Nonetheless, the
positive relationship of large shareholders does not tell us the actual problem of firms controlled
by large shareholders, as many large shareholders controlled firms failed during the crisis.
Majority controlled firms and dominant minority controlled firms do not seem to have
influenced ftrm's value significantly. Similarly in 1997, dispersed and dominant structure
suffered significantly during the first period of the crisis. Tobin's q for Majority controlled firms
was found to be negative in value, but not significantly. Pertaining to this, majority controlled
firms appear to be the only one structure that maintains a positive value for PE ratio in 1996 and
1997. Others structures do not show any significant influences on PE value. Although majority
controlled firms show a positive value, we are uncertain which identities could enhance market
performance.
Table 6 clearly illustrates that family controlled, conglomerate affrliation, state and institutional
controlled firms are less efficient as compared to foreign owned firms. This is shown in the
significantly negative ROA results. Family and conglomerate firms may not be that efficient due
to consumption of perquisite in the firms (Morck and Yeung, 2003), while state and financial
institutions investment structure firms face free ride problem in monitoring firm's performance
(Putterman, 1993; Short & Keasey, 1997).
Insignificant result in firm value- Tobin's q 1996 between ownership identities is in accordance
with Lemmon and Lins' argument that any misalignment of ownership structure will only
shown during crisis as any minor misappropriation will be easily captured into share price
during good period. Instead, they conclude that a shock period give good opportunities for firms
to expropriate other shareholders. Obviously, conglomerate firms show a significantly negative
adverse result in firms' value as compared to the other structures. This indicates the possibility of
expropriating shareholders as dividend has increased ( table 5) but firm's value deteriorates at the
same time. Despite being insignificant, comparatively, family and state controlled firms' exhibit
a stronger firm's value.
Interestingly, even though family and controlled frms show up poorly in accounting
performance, their performances are significantly better in terms of PE ratio in 1996, especially
family firms. Family controlled firms seem to suffer the least from the adverse impacts the
economic crisis (Tobin's q 1997) compared to other structures. Family controlled firms are also
found to pursue sales expansion (log sales) objectives. The difference from other structures is at
a significant level. Therefore, we can conclude that principally family controlled firm still
maintains the passion of entrepreneurship, which focus on firms output efficiency- expansion as
well as maximization of shareholders' value.
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Although their performance has been moderately fair in firm's value, firms controlled by other
institutional investment trust firms are not impressive in operating efficiency ratio. Its PE (1997)
ratio, as shown in Tobin's q statistics;. Dispersed structure, on the other hand does not seem to
exert significant influence on PE performance..
[Insert Table 5 about here]
[Insert Table 6 about here]
CONCLUDING REMARKS
Although preliminary, our study has uncovered some salient features of share ownership among
Malaysian listed corporations. First, using leverage to mitigate agency conflicts may not be
efficient due to the influence of Malaysian government micro policy as all Malaysian firms
record a higher leverage ratio to foreign firms. The dividend declaration is consistent with our
hypotheses, but conglomerate firms are found to declare more special dividend as compared to
others. Second, Firm size as a measurement of asymmetric information does not significantly
differ from one another, except that state controlled frrms are found to be the smallest in terms of
assets. However, dispersed structure and state controlled firms illustrate the need to share the
firm's information as highlighted by high cash flow. Through vertical integration, conglomerate
firms are found to internalize the asymmetric information problem. Lastly, majority controlled,
as well as family and conglomerate firms are business risk inclined, in contrast to our hlpothesis.
On the other hand, dispersed struchre firms are less risk averse towards capital market risk,
while majority as well as family and conglomerate firms are more capital market risk averse. The
difference in these two risks perception between family and conglomerate firms, suggests that
they have transferred business risk to debt holders.
In terms of performance, we have shown that dispersed structure performs sub optimally as
compared to majority controlled firms. However, our attempts in classifying ownership by
substantial shareholder identities help to throw more lights on the problem of agency conflict
Family controlled appear to be more outstanding in terms of maximisation of sales as well as
shareholders' value. The influence of microenvironment factors where higher debt strategies are
observed in all structure and identities is found to have affected our analysis. With higher debt,
risk has been transferred to debt holders. Conglomerate firms appear to act inationally by
declaring higher dividend, This seems to have compromised the firm's overall value.
Nevertheless, a separate study on capital structure is deemed essential.
The limitations of this paper, however, lie greatly on the fact that it has not critically examined
the issue of industrial factors and market competition. The competition of each industry
highlights the market attractiveness as it determines the entry and exit of shareholders funds into
the capital market. Malaysian industry is profoundly monopolistic and oligopolistic, arc large
shareholding structure mostly found in certain industries? This is an interesting issue to address
as industry structures indirectly determine the flow of funds in the capital market.
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' On average, the three largest stockfrolders own 54o/o of the voting stock in the 10 largest firms
in Malaysia, 49o/o in the case of Singapore and 460/o in Thailand.
" The research was based on cross sectional study on nine East Asian Countries. The sample size
for Malaysian firm was 133 firms. Others countries which found no exploitation of minority
interests are Singapore and Taiwan. The countries which found exploitation of minority
shareholders are Japan, Korea, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Philippine, and Thai.
iiiWe define state ownership as institutions established under Parliament Act of Malaysia. Apart
of Ministry of Finance investment arms- Khazanah Holdings Bhd. State agency such as State
Economics Development Authority are considered state owned. We consider National
Investment Corporation-Pemodalan Nasional Berhad (PNB) and its unit investment arms as
state owned, others are such as, Employee Provident Fund (EPF), Armed Forces Fund (LTAT) ,
and Muslim Pilgrim Saving and Management Authority (LUTH) and others government saving
institutions such as Bank Industry, and etc.
'u. The industry is greatly regulated under The Banking and Financial Act, 1989. The Banking
and Financial Act, 1989 allow Financial Institutions (FIs) to make portfolio investments in non-
financial business up to a maximum of 20 percent of a Fis' shareholders' funds and up to 10
percent of the issued share capital of a company in which the investment is made. The Fls are
not allowed to assume any management role to take up a board position.
u'Zhuang, J., Edwards, D., & Capulong's (1998) report for Asia Development Bank (1998) that
nominees companies as the largest investors among the top five shareholders in Malaysia. It
stood as 45.6% in 1997.
ui This is opposing to the generic economic argument that state should invest in large firm
especially utilities firms for welfare economic purposes. Malaysian state had privatised most of
its large utilities plant. In fact, our sample shows that the identities of the state control firms are
mainly from state agency and their state unit trust investment arms and not hold by the federal
government. The result of our state structure was over shadowed by the influences from PNB
and Petronas which hold substantial shareholdings. In fact Singh (2003) challenges the
capabilities of these state agency and trust funds management. A separate study in this
perspective is essential.
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Table I
Factors Explaining Ownership Structure
Governance Variables (Proxies) Hypotheses
Issues
Information Asset Specificity Dispersed structure and state
Asymmetry -Firm size Log Total ownership tend to be bigger in size
Asset
Majority and foreign have less cash
-Cash Flow Operating flow (specific information) to be
Cash Flow shared.
Dispersed structure has more cash
flow to be shared to reduce risk
Firm life cycle Dispersed structure controlling
-Years of stake is diluted through over the
establishment Age Est. years (age).
-Years of listing Age Listing The age of Foreign and majority
control firms is positively related to
their controlling stake to retain
control.
Agency Agency conflicts Debt/ Majority controlled firm has higher
Conflicts Leverage Equity leverage.
Dividend Dividend Majority, foreign and state firms
declare higher dividend.
Risk Risk Standard
deviation of Dispersed structure is less risk
Business risk total firms' averse towards Business risk
sales/total
assets
Capital market risk
Performance Maximizationof
Sales
Dispersed structure is positively
related to Beta.
Beta
Log Sales Dispersed structure pursues the
objective of maximization of sales
Maximization of
Shareholder's
value-
Operation ROA State, majority, and foreign pursue
efficiency the objective of maximization of
shareholder value
Market Tobin's q
Performance PE ratio 24
Table 2
D e s crip tiv e s t ati s ti c s
Panel A MinimumMaximum Mean
std.
Deviation
Dividend
DebVEquity
Log Total asset
Cash ('oo,ooo)
Sd.sales/t.assets
Beta
Age establishment
Age of listing
Log sales
ROA 96
Tobin q value96
Tobin q value97
PE ratio 1996
PE ratio 1997
0.000 0.95 0.1085
0.000 4.530 0.61
3.60 7.37 5.54
-1.867 20.018 0.929
0.014 2.872 0.353
0.011 2.007 0.944
8.000 94.000 34.878
7.000 42.000 23.068
2 6.82 5.404
-0.753 0.664 0.095
-15.880 77.095 2.327
-47.659 4.9',77 0.548
-57r.63 4246 5s.65
-65.69 43l.st 17.463
0.1412
1.627
0.51
1.993
0.418
0.s83
16.449
10.940
0.639
0.1 63
7.054
4.419
36r.r7
46.63
Panel B
Number offirms in each type of ownership structure.
Notes: Share concentration's means in parentheses
Disp: Dispersed structure; Dom Min: Dominant minority; Maj:majority; Statr state; Forei:
foreign; Inst= institutional; Fam: Family; Cong Aff: conglomerate affiliation
Ownership concentration: Disp+Dom.Min+Maj.+ State* Forei: 1 00%
Ownership identities: Di sp I + Inst+Fam+Cong.Aff+State+Forei
Own.
Share
Disp Displ Inst Dom. tr'am Maj. Cong.
Min. Aff.
State tr'orei.
<20
20-50
>50
22
(1 1.7s)
148
(10.88 (e.4s)
) 58 42 16(32.e2) (33.02 (42.77))15 32 r7(s6.4s (s7.7s (se.39)))
2l(le.0s (14.8)
)
t6
(38.5 r
)79(60.0r (s4.87
N
Mean
oA
22
(l l.7s)
t5.65%
148
(10.88 (e.4s)) s.4%
952%
58 s7 32 33(32.e2) (3e.18 (s7.7s (s0.8s
3s.37% ) ) )
38.8% 2r.77 22.45
%%
25 l0(42.97 s0.42) 6.12%
t7.01
o/o
25
Table 3
The effects of asymmetric information, agency conflicts and risk on ownership
(Multinominal Logis tic Analy sis)
Own.Str. Lev. Size Cash Bus.Risk Risk Yrs.Est Yrs List
Disperse
d
Dominan
t
Majority
State
Foreign
0.899 1.1 l0 0.043 0.06
0.00
0.267
(0.828)
0.2t2
0.00
0.265
(0. t t+;'rx
0.455
(0.1 l7)**
0.00
(0.e08)
-0.503
(0.e71)
-2.546
(r.196)*
-1.383
0.00
-0.245
(0.366)
-1.184
(0.527)*
0.395
(0.3e3)
-1.727
(0.83 1)*
0.00
-2.r8
( 1 . 1_8_8)
0.463
(1.003)
-3.03
(1.8.3.8)
0.181
(0.613)
-0.954
(0.70e)
-t.644
(0.ry2)*
-2.406
(r.0:8)*
0.00 0.00 0.00
-0.483 -0.003 0.01s
(0.502) (0.107)*x
0.497 0.388
(0.1 13)**(0.589) :*
-0.67 0.243
(0.026) (0.043)
0.031 -0.009
(0.02e) (0.04e)
0.008 -0.017
(0.034) (0.0s6)
-0.015 0.06
The effect on dispersed ownership functions as a baseline
Lev :debVequity; Div: dividend declared in 1996 Size= log firm total asset; Cash = is defined
as cash flow from operations- profrt/(loss) before tax plus depreciation adjusted for share of
results of associated and exceptional items; Bus.Risk: Standard deviation of all firms sales/ total
asset in the industry. Cap. Risk: beta, log of weakly returns of the stock price against the weakly
returns of the KLSE-EMAS index.;Yrs.Est::Years of establishment; Yrs List::Years of listing
Standard error value in parenthesis;
*p<0. l0; ** p<0.05; *** p< 0.01
Table 4
Ownership fficts on Leverage, Dividend, Size, Cash flow, Business and Capital market risks
(means)
Dividend# Size Bus. Risk . Risk
Family
State
Foreign
Institutional
Levine test
A 6.45 A
AB t5.24 B
AB 8.83 A
B 29.34 B
A 7.93 B
A 5.36 A
0.68
0.59
0.51
0.31
0.84
0.64
1.329
0.255
5.505A8
5.6728
5.5l4AB
5.437 AB
s.293 A
s.6628
0.75 A
1.255 A
1.856B
0.656A
0.369 A
0.769 A
0.443C
0.448AC
0.34B
0.541A
0.441ABC
0.4228C
1.096A8
0.794C
0.726CD
0.461D
0.581CD
l.319AB
14.tt3 0.991 3.945
0.002
r.213
.316
t.102
0.411
Notes:- # The variables variances are not equal. Dunnett's test is applied.
Figures with the same letter code are not significantly different at p<0.10
Notes:
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